Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction

Changkun JIANG; Lin GAO

doi:10.11959/j.issn.2096-3750.2019.00109

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Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction

Theory and Technology | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction
- Chinese Journal on Internet of Things Vol. 3, Issue 3, Pages: 26-33(2019)
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 深圳大学计算机与软件学院，广东深圳 518060
  2. 哈尔滨工业大学（深圳）电子与信息工程学院，广东深圳 518055
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.2096-3750.2019.00109
  CLC： TN915
- Published：30 September 2019，
  
  Published Online：2019-09，
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
CHANGKUN JIANG, LIN GAO. Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction. [J]. Chinese journal on internet of things, 2019, 3(3): 26-33.
DOI：

CHANGKUN JIANG, LIN GAO. Mechanism design for crowd sensing with data reuse based on two-sided auction. [J]. Chinese journal on internet of things, 2019, 3(3): 26-33. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.2096-3750.2019.00109.

摘要

群智感知是一种有前景的感知范式，其主要借助大量移动设备中的多样嵌入式传感器来完成数据感知任务。群智感知中的一个关键问题是如何有效地协调移动设备用户同时执行多项感知任务。通过在感知任务和用户之间引入一个新的数据层，从而有效地利用感知任务的相似性和用户的异质性，在数据层之上建立联合任务选择和用户调度问题，旨在最大化整个系统的社会福利。这个问题因其组合特性以及存在感知任务和用户两方面的私有信息而很难解决。为了处理上述问题，提出了一种双边随机拍卖机制，并证明其能够满足计算高效性、个体理性和期望意义下的激励相容性。仿真结果表明，所提的随机拍卖机制可以接近最优的社会福利，并且数据复用带来的社会福利收益会随着任务相似性的增强而显著增加。

Abstract

Crowd sensing is a promising sensing paradigm

which mainly uses a variety of embedded sensors in a large number of mobile devices to accomplish data sensing tasks.One of the key issues in crowd sensing is how to effectively coordinate mobile device users to perform multiple sensory tasks simultaneously.By introducing a new data layer between the sensing task and the user

the similarity of the sensing task and the heterogeneity of the user were effectively utilized

and the joint task selection and user scheduling problems were established on the data layer

aiming at maximizing the social welfare of the whole system.This problem was difficult to solve due to its combinatorial nature and the presence of private information on both the sensing tasks and the users.In order to deal with these problems

a two-sided randomized auction mechanism was proposed

and it was proved that it can satisfy the desirable properties of the computational efficiency

the individual rationality

and the incentive compatibility in expectation.The simulation results show that the proposed stochastic auction mechanism can achieve nearly optimal social welfare

and the social welfare benefits brought by data reuse will increase significantly with the enhancement of task similarity.

关键词

群智感知数据复用激励机制拍卖机制

Keywords

crowd sensingdata reuseincentive mechanismauction mechanism

references

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